The controversy over Peter Obi’s financial legacy in Anambra State has taken a new turn, with World Bank and IFAD records raising questions over who actually borrowed the money behind several major projects linked to his administration.
The documents reviewed show that the Federal Republic of Nigeria was the borrower in several of the programmes, while Anambra was among the states selected to implement projects and receive the benefits.
That distinction could prove important in the ongoing debate over Anambra’s debt profile, because being a beneficiary or participating state is not necessarily the same as being the principal borrower.

At the centre of the controversy are programmes including the Nigeria Malaria Control Booster Project, Fadama III, the State Education Program Investment Project, NEWMAP, the Value Chain Development Programme, the Community and Social Development Project and Health Systems Development programmes.
For the Nigeria Malaria Control Booster Project, World Bank records show a US$180m IDA credit to Nigeria, with Anambra among seven participating states.
The Fadama III programme similarly operated as a World Bank/IDA-backed national project, with Anambra participating through its own state project structure and benefiting from IDA financing.
The financing structure becomes even clearer in the case of SEPIP.
The World Bank records identify the Federal Republic of Nigeria as the borrower of the original US$150m IDA credit, with funds subsequently made available to Anambra, Bauchi and Ekiti through subsidiary financing arrangements.
NEWMAP followed the same broad federal structure.
The original US$600m financing agreement for the erosion and watershed management project was entered into between the International Development Association and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, while participating states, including Anambra, implemented projects through state-level structures.
The Value Chain Development Programme also involved federal borrowing.
IFAD records show that the programme was financed through an agreement involving the Federal Government of Nigeria and IFAD, with Anambra among the participating states alongside Benue, Ebonyi, Niger, Ogun and Taraba.
The same distinction applies to the Community and Social Development Project, where the original World Bank financing was provided to the Federal Republic of Nigeria for implementation across participating states.
The Health Systems Development projects require a closer examination because Anambra-specific records contain references to state-level financing and separate additional financing arrangements.
The broader point, however, remains the same: a project being implemented in Anambra does not, by itself, establish that the Anambra State Government was the original borrower.
That distinction is now central to the argument over how Obi’s financial record should be presented.
If the issue is Anambra’s actual debt burden, the relevant questions are not simply how many World Bank-assisted projects were implemented during Obi’s tenure.
The questions are: Who signed the financing agreement? Who was legally responsible for repayment? Was there a subsidiary agreement with Anambra? What amount, if any, became a direct liability of the state?
Those answers could significantly change how the projects are classified in any assessment of the state’s borrowing under Obi.
The records therefore do not, on their own, settle the wider political argument over Obi’s financial legacy.
What they do establish is the need to separate federal borrowing, state participation, project implementation and direct state debt before drawing conclusions about Anambra’s liabilities.
That distinction is particularly important as competing narratives emerge over the finances inherited by successive administrations.
The latest documents have consequently shifted the debate from simply asking “What loans did Obi take?” to a more precise question:
“Which of the loans associated with projects implemented in Anambra were actually liabilities of the state?”
That is a question that can ultimately be settled by the original financing agreements, subsidiary loan arrangements, state debt records and the relevant handover documents.
