By Teejani Jimoh, Esq.
In the last couple of days, supporters of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan had eagerly counted down to the expiration of her six-month suspension from the Senate, imposed on 6th March 2025. To them, the effluxion of time seemed to promise an end to months of controversy and exclusion. The suspension itself had been mired in dispute: critics denounced it as unconstitutional and overreaching, while the Federal High Court, in a judgment described by many as neither here nor there, stopped short of a definite pronouncement that would have settled the matter once and for all. Thus, while the court acknowledged the excessiveness of the punishment, it left lingering uncertainty in its wake.
Against this backdrop, supporters reasonably believed that the expiry of the suspension period on 6th September 2025 would draw a line under the matter, allowing the Senator to resume her duties and restore representation to the people of Kogi Central. Instead, they were met with yet another obstacle. The Clerk to the National Assembly declared that Senator Natasha could not return, on the footing that the issue remained sub judice before the Court of Appeal.
The Clerk to the National Assembly’s claim that Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan cannot resume her seat because the matter is sub judice before the Court of Appeal is constitutionally and legally indefensible. The suspension imposed on her by the Senate on 6th March 2025 was for a fixed term of six months. By 4 September 2025, that term had expired. The question is whether, notwithstanding pending appeals, the Senate or its Clerk can continue to bar her from resuming. The answer is emphatically no.
In this discussion, we shall shed further light on why the National Assembly’s position is untenable, and why the rule of law, constitutional safeguards, and judicial precedent all compel the immediate restoration of Senator Natasha to her rightful seat.
Constitutional and Statutory Limits
Section 60 of the 1999 Constitution gives each chamber power to regulate its procedure, but only subject to the Constitution. Section 4(8) reserves to the courts jurisdiction over legislative actions.
The Senate Standing Orders themselves impose a maximum suspension of 14 legislative days. The Legislative Houses (Powers and Privileges) Act 2017 likewise contemplates only short suspensions in narrowly defined circumstances. A six-month suspension is therefore ultra vires from inception. The Senate’s own framework and the courts point one way. The Senate Standing Orders limits any suspension to fourteen legislative days, whilst the Legislative Houses Powers and Privileges Act, contemplates only brief suspensions in narrow circumstances. A six month exclusion sits far outside both instruments and is therefore ultra vires.
Judicial Precedent, Expiry of Punishment, and Autrefois Convict
In Ndume’s case, a suspension running into months was declared illegal and set aside, with consequential orders for reinstatement and arrears. In Omo-Agege’s case, the Federal High Court held that any suspension exceeding fourteen legislative days offends the Constitution and deprives constituents of representation. In Jibrin’s case, a one hundred and eighty day exclusion was condemned as an arbitrary exhibition of power and voided. Most recently, in July 2025, Justice Binta Nyako characterised Senator Natasha’s six month suspension as excessive and overreaching the Constitution, even if the court did not compel immediate recall.
Even assuming without conceding that the original sanction was lawful, it has expired. A definite suspension is self expiring. Neither the Standing Orders nor the statute requires a further resolution to “reinstate”. The Senate is functus officio. Its role ended with the imposition and lapse of the fixed penalty. At this stage the Senator can rightly plead autrefois convict. She has been punished. The sentence has been served. To persist in excluding her is to visit a second punishment for the same alleged wrongdoing, an impermissible shifting of the goalposts that offends the constitutional ethos reflected in section 36, subsection 9 on double jeopardy, by persuasive analogy.
What remains for the Court of Appeal is a backward looking inquiry into the legality and due process of the original suspension. That pending appeal does not operate as an automatic stay, and it cannot breathe life into a sanction that has run its course. Continued administrative obstruction by the Clerk is therefore extra legal, and indistinguishable from an unlawful, indefinite suspension.
The Misuse of Sub Judice
The Clerk’s invocation of sub judice is misplaced. In parliamentary practice, sub judice is a voluntary restraint on debate of active cases, not a legal bar on routine administration. Allowing Senator Natasha Akpoti Uduaghan to resume does not pre judge the appeal, it merely recognises that the Senate’s own resolution has expired. It is the continued enforcement of a lapsed suspension that prejudges the appeal, for it assumes the Senate will prevail and thereby extends a punishment without lawful authority. The Court of Appeal remains free to pronounce on the legality and due process of the original suspension. A pending appeal, absent a specific order for stay, cannot justify ongoing exclusion. The correct course, consistent with constitutional comity and representation, is to restore the Senator’s seat and let the court’s eventual decision guide any future step.
Authority of the Clerk and Comparative Norms
The Clerk to the National Assembly has no independent power to bar an elected Senator. The office is administrative and ministerial, charged with giving effect to decisions properly taken by the Senate or ordered by a court. There is no fresh Senate resolution extending any sanction, and there is no court order forbidding resumption. By blocking Senator Natasha Akpoti Uduaghan, the Clerk has acted ultra vires, assuming a disciplinary power that belongs to the Senate as a whole and only within constitutional limits.
Practice supports this position. In Omo-Agege’s case, once the Federal High Court nullified the suspension, the Senator returned to the chamber despite the Senate’s appeal. In Jibrin’s case, the member resumed after the one hundred and eighty day term elapsed even while litigation continued. Across the Commonwealth, courts have condemned long exclusions for denying representation, as seen in the Indian Supreme Court’s decision striking down extended suspensions. The settled norm is simple. When the fixed term lapses, a legislator resumes unless a new, lawful sanction is imposed. Anything else disenfranchises constituents and undermines democratic accountability.
Conclusion
The National Assembly’s position collapses under scrutiny. Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan’s suspension was unlawful ab initio; even if it were lawful, it has expired. The Senate is functus officio and cannot revive or elongate a fixed sanction. She has served the penalty imposed. She now stands on terra firma and may properly invoke autrefois convict: she has been punished, and any further exclusion would be a second punishment for the same alleged offence, contrary to constitutional principles, established authority and the rule of natural justice and equity.
Sub judice is no bar. It is a convention of restraint in debate, not a legal prohibition on routine administration. There is no Senate resolution extending any sanction and no court order staying her return. The Clerk possesses no independent power to invent one. Persisting in her exclusion would be an extra legal continuation of a lapsed penalty, a shifting of the goalposts that seeks to steal the match after time has been called. This is the latest in a series of affronts by the Senate to the authority of the courts and to the rule of law.
The only lawful course is immediate resumption. Anything less is a usurpation of judicial authority, a wrongful confiscation of her mandate, and a betrayal of the people of Kogi Central who are entitled to representation in the Senate.