Nigeria’s mandatory SIM registration and NIN–SIM linkage policy was introduced as a decisive tool to curb crime, end anonymous communication and strengthen national security. Five years on, the policy is facing a credibility test as kidnappers and criminal gangs continue to place ransom calls with alarming ease.
The recent admission by the Minister of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy, Dr. Bosun Tijani, that criminals now deploy advanced call-routing technologies underscores a central policy failure: the assumption that identity linkage alone could neutralise technologically adaptive criminal networks.
At its core, the NIN–SIM policy was designed as a blunt instrument—effective against casual fraud and unregistered users, but ill-equipped to confront organised criminal enterprises. While millions of law-abiding Nigerians were compelled to comply or lose connectivity, criminal groups quickly migrated to methods that bypass traditional telecom tracking, including tower hopping, illegal SIM gateways and operations in unserved network zones.
This has exposed a structural imbalance in policy execution. The burden of compliance fell overwhelmingly on citizens and businesses, while parallel investments in intelligence integration, rural infrastructure and real-time surveillance lagged behind. The result is a system that is administratively heavy but operationally porous.
Government officials now point to connectivity gaps in remote areas as a key enabler of criminal activity. Yet these blind spots were known at the time the policy was rolled out.
The failure to synchronise SIM monitoring with aggressive rural network expansion created loopholes that criminals were quick to exploit.
The reliance on post-policy infrastructure fixes—such as the proposed deployment of 4,000 telecom towers and satellite upgrades—highlights another weakness: reactive planning. These measures, while necessary, amount to retroactive corrections rather than evidence of foresight.
Equally concerning is the lack of publicly available performance metrics. Since the introduction of the NIN–SIM linkage, the government has not released comprehensive data showing a sustained reduction in telecom-enabled crimes directly attributable to the policy. Without measurable benchmarks, the policy’s success remains largely asserted, not demonstrated.
Past emergency responses further complicate the picture. The 2021 telecom shutdown in Zamfara State may have delivered short-term security gains, but it also inflicted economic harm and raised civil liberties concerns. These stopgap measures underscore a policy environment that oscillates between overreach and underperformance.
Minister Tijani’s acknowledgement that the challenge is “far more technical” than commonly assumed signals an important shift in tone. However, critics argue that recognition alone is insufficient without a transparent policy audit that identifies failures, reallocates responsibility and resets strategy.
For Nigeria’s telecom security framework to regain credibility, experts say the focus must move beyond identity control to a layered model that integrates infrastructure, intelligence sharing, legal oversight and technological innovation. Until then, SIM monitoring risks remaining a compliance exercise for citizens—while criminals continue to operate several steps ahead.
SIM Registration Falls Short as Criminals Outpace Nigeria’s Telecom Security Policy
